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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant

of Burglary.

When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the

evidence, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most
State

favorable to the jury's verdict.
236 (Utah 1992);

State

v. Hayes,

(citing State v. Lemons,
denied,

v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232,

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)

844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992),

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Booker,

342, 345 (Utah 1985) quoting State

v. Petree,

cert,

709 P.2d

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah

1983) ). Reversal is appropriate "only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
4

minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted."

State

P. 2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State

v.

1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
2.

denied,

v. Burk,

Salas,

839

820 P.2d

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)).

Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the

jury as to what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime
prior to being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary.

"A

trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the facts of the case."
1992) (citing State

v.

State v. Hamilton,
Potter,

827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah

627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981)).

The

challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
v. Archuleta,

850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993), cert,

S.Ct. 476 (1993); Hamilton,
770 P.2d 131, 133
Dist.

No. 1 v.

State

v. Lucero,

Cattle

Co.,

presents

Special

Serv.

circumstances

For the reasons stated below, this
constituting

State

1201, 1208-09 & n.3 (Utah 1993);
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent
v. Archambeau,

Portillo,

County

Farr,

866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993) . This issue was not

exceptional or unusual circumstances.

State

Kane

114

744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987));

raised before the trial court.
issue

denied,

827 P.2d at 238 (citing Ramon v.

(Utah 1989); Western

Jackson

State

appeal,

plain

See State

error

and

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

v. Gibbons,

740 P.2d 1309,

779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989);

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996).

5

or

v.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By way of Amended Information, Defendant, Roger Wayne Van
Cleave, was charged with Burglary, a second degree

felony, in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, to which Defendant
pleaded not guilty.

On January 4, 1994, Defendant appeared for a

jury trial, after which Defendant was convicted as charged.

The

matter was then set for sentencing on January 25, 1994.
On January 25, 1994, Defendant and appointed counsel, Glen T.
Cella, appeared for sentencing.

At sentencing, the trial court

sentenced Defendant to imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for 1-15
years.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 5, 1993, the Kjar home located in

Centerville,

Utah,

was

burglarized

(R.

216-18,

Jury

Trial

Transcript).
2.

At the time of the burglary, the Kjar family was away on a

family vacation (R. 216, lines 11-16, Jury Trial Transcript).

6

During

the burglary, someone took several items of personal property,
including a Winchester Pump Rifle and case, a Yamaha twelve-string
guitar, a three-quarter size six-string guitar, an amp speaker, and
a music mixer (R. 225, 230, 167-74, Jury Trial Transcript).
3.

Defendant worked on a construction crew doing construction

work at the Kjar home around the time of the burglary (R. 180-82;
192-96, Jury Trial Transcript) .
4.

On or about the afternoon of July 5, 1993, Defendant pawned

the Winchester Pump Rifle, Yamaha guitar, amp speaker, and music
mixer (R. 222-30, Jury Trial Transcript) •

On or about that same

date, Defendant gave the three-quarter size guitar to his nephew as
a gift (R. 247-49, Jury Trial Transcript).
5.

By way of Amended Information filed January 20, 1994,

Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, to which Defendant
pleaded not guilty (R. 28, Amended Information).
6.

When the investigating officers first went to the Kjar

residence, they made no effort to look for and collect fingerprints
(R. 277, Jury Trial Transcript) . The investigating officers made no
effort to obtain fingerprints from the personal property or Kjar
residence at any time during the investigation or prior to trial (R.
280, Jury Trial Transcript) .

Finally, the investigating officers

made no effort to preserve any physical evidence, i.e., fingerprints,

7

that might have existed on the personal property that was stolen from
the Kjar residence (R. 282, Jury Trial Transcript).
7.

At the jury trial on January 19, 1994, Defendant contended

that the property had been stolen from the Kjar home by another
individual or friend, and that Defendant had only pawned the property
without knowing that it had been stolen (R. 227, lines 14-20, 249-51,
Jury Trial Transcript) .
8.

Jury

Instruction No. 15, with which the trial court

instructed the jury, states:
Before you can convict the defendant, Roger
Wayne VanCleave [sic], of the crime of burglary
as charged in the Information on file in this
case, you must believe from all of the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every
one of the following elements of that offense:
1.
That on or before the 5th day of July,
1993, in Davis County, State of Utah, a dwelling
in Centerville was unlawfully entered; and
2.
Whoever entered that dwelling on that
occasion did so with the intent to commit theft;
and
3.
That Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic],
defendant, was a party to the offense referred
to in paragraphs one and two; and
4.
That said Roger Wayne Van Cleave [sic]
acted intentionally or knowingly.
If after careful consideration of all the
evidence in this case, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of
the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand you
are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty
of burglary as charged in the Information on
file in this case.
(R. 58.)
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9.

Jury

Instruction No. 18, with which

the trial court

instructed the jury, states:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of burglary, who
directly
commits burglary, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aides another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes burglary shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Thus, if you find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Roger
Wayne VanCleave [sic], was a party to the
burglary charged in the Information you may find
him guilty even though you are not convinced
that he personally entered the dwelling.
(R. 62.)
10.

Jury

Instruction

No.

22,

with

which

the

jury

was

instructed, states:
You are instructed that in every crime or
public offense, there must be a union or joint
operation of the act and intent.
(R. 67.)
11.

Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial

court received the following note from the jury:

"What does "party"

mean in regards to when a person became aware of a crime?

Is a

person a "party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it
was committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand?
during?
12.

Or

Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included).
Upon receiving the aforementioned note from the jury, the

following exchange between the trial court and counsel took place:
THE COURT: The record should note that we are
in chambers with counsel in regards to the Van
Cleave case. I have received a communication
from the jury that asks this. "What does party

9

mean in regards to when a person became aware of
a crime?
Is a person a party to burglary if
they are aware of the crime after it was
committed or do they have to be aware of it
beforehand or during?" And so maybe we ought to
give them —
send them in the aiding and
abetting statute.
I don't know how else to
instruct them.
MR. HARWARD:
You know, it's kind of
interesting. It tells me I do an inadequate job
on that point because in my last trial two weeks
ago with Judge Memmott there was a similar fact
pattern and we got a similar question from the
jury. What we did in that case is referred them
to the instruction, but there is a question a
little more specific now.
THE COURT:

The instructions won't cover this.

MR. HARWARD: I think it's clear in the law that
if he finds out after, he's not a party to the
burglary. To be guilty of burglary, it has to
be before or during.
THE COURT:
But if he aids and abets after,
isn't he guilty of the same thing?
MR. HARWARD:
Except we don't have the old
abetting statute.
THE COURT:

That's it, huh.

MR. HARWARD: See, it used to have the concept,
the accessory after the fact.
THE COURT:

We don't have that?

MR. HARWARD: That is the party instruction and
so he has to have the same state of mind.
THE COURT:
There has got to be a joint
operation of act and intent, so we'll just refer
them to that instruction.
MR. HARWARD:

Yes, that's correct.

MR. CELLA: I think that's all we can do because
we don't have anything after the fact like we
used to.

10

MR. HARWARD:
Sounds like they are struggling
over the burglary think.
THE COURT:
I will send them in this
instruction, you are instructed that in every
crime or public offense — I think that's the
key to it. All right?
MR. HARWARD:
MR. CELLA:
MR. HARWARD:

All right.
All right.
I agree.

THE COURT: Here's what I'm saying. Jurors,
please find attached a copy of one of the
instructions which is a part of your jury
instructions.
Please review this along with
your other instructions.
This should answer
your question.
MR. HARWARD:
THE COURT:

I agree.
Okay.

Take this back into them.

(R. 348-50, Jury Trial Transcript).
13.

The jury convicted Defendant, after which, on January 25,

1994, Defendant was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 1 to 15
years at the Utah State Prison on each count, with sentences to run
concurrently both with each other and with a previous sentence being
served at the time (R. 103, Judgment).
14.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on February 22, 1994 (R.

97, Notice of Appeal).
15.

Judgment was entered on March 14, 1994 (R. 103, Judgment) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the

conviction of Defendant as a party to the burglary of the Kjar
11

residence inasmuch as there is no evidence connecting Defendant to
the entry of the home as a party or otherwise.

There is no physical

evidence connecting Defendant, as a party, to entering or remaining
unlawfully in the Kjar residence.

The State presented no evidence,

that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with the same
mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully in the
residence

and

solicited,

requested,

commanded,

encouraged,

or

intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in
the Kjar residence with intent to commit theft.

In fact, the State's

own witness incontrovertibly testified that Defendant had told her
that he did not burglarize the Kjar home but rather a friend had
burglarized the home and then had asked Defendant to pawn the items
for him as a favor, without Defendant knowing that the items had been
stolen.

As a result, the State failed to prove each element beyond

a reasonable doubt, as it is required to do.
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary is
viewed is a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is
insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of burglary as a
party.

Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate in

the instant case because the evidence, even when so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
2.

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to

what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime prior to

12

being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary.
that

this issue is raised

Notwithstanding

for the first time on appeal, the

consideration of this issue is wholly appropriate inasmuch as the
trial court committed plain error and there are exceptional or
unusual circumstances existing as a result of the and confusion
created by the trial court's refusal and failure to property instruct
the jury as to the requirements of Defendant's awareness prior to a
conviction of Defendant as a party for the crime of burglary.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT AS A PARTY TO THE BURGLARY
OF THE KJAR RESIDENCE INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE ENTRY OF THE HOME AS A
PARTY OR OTHERWISE.

When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
State

v. Hayes,

Lemons,

State v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992);

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)

844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert,

948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State
1985) (quoting State

v.

v. Booker,

Petree,

(citing State
denied,

v.

857 P.2d

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate "only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."

State

v.

Burk,

839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992)
13

(quoting State
denied,

v. Salas,

820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991),

cert,

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)).

This standard of applies even where much of the evidence is
State

circumstantial.
1993) (citing State
v. Nickles,

v.

Barlow,

851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.

v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) and

728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 1986)).

State

As a matter of well-

settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused."

See Nickles,

728 P.2d at 126.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of *such
quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.'" Span,
P.2d at 127) .

819 P.2d at 332 (quoting Nickles,

728

However, the following standard applies when the

evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence:
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to
determine (1) whether there is any evidence that
supports each and every element of the crime
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can
be drawn from that evidence have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient
to prove each legal element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is
not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt.
State

v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,

a "Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light
most
Hayes,

favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'"
860 P.2d at 972 (quoting State
14

v.

Vigil,

840 P.2d 788, 793

(Utah App. 1992) cert, denied,

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).

In the

instant case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support
of the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then
persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the
State failed to prove that he was a party to the burglary of the Kjar
residence.

See State

v. Scheel,

823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 defines burglary as follows:

"A

person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony
or theft or commit an assault on any person."

Section 76-2-202

defines criminal liability as a party to a crime as follows:

"Every

person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as
a party for such conduct."

In other words, "[o]ne may be convicted

as an accomplice if, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense, he or she ^solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense.'" State

v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah

App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202).
To

convict

Defendant of burglary, as a party, under the

aforementioned statutes, the State had to prove that (1) on or about
July 5, 1993, someone entered or unlawfully remained in the Kjar
residence

(2) with intent to commit a felony or theft, and that

15

Defendant

(3) acted with the same mental

state as the person

who

entered or unlawfully remained in the residence with intent to commit
theft

and

(4)

solicited,

requested,

commanded,

encouraged,

or

intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in
the

Kjar

residence

with

intent

to

commit

theft.

The

State,

as

required by Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-1-501, 1 had the burden to prove each
of the aforementioned elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The following is the evidence that supports the jury's verdict
that

Defendant was a party to the burglary of the Kjar home:

(1)

Defendant worked on the construction crew doing construction work at
the Kjar home around the time of the burglary
Jury

Trial

Transcript);

(2)

during

the

(R. 180-82; 192-96,

course

of

performing

construction work on the Kjar home, there was a discussion in the
presence of Defendant about the Kjar family leaving to go on vacation
(R. 182, Jury Trial Transcript) ; (3) on or about the afternoon of
July

5,

guitar,

x

1993,
amp

Defendant

speaker,

pawned

and

a Winchester

music

mixer

(R.

Pump

Rifle,

222-30,

Jury

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b)
The
culpable
mental
state
required.

16

Yamaha
Trial

Transcript), which, according to testimony at trial, were identified
as items that had been taken from the Kjar residence in the course of
the burglary; (4) on or about that same date, Defendant gave a threequarter size guitar to his nephew as a gift (R. 247-49, Jury Trial
Transcript), which, according to testimony at trial, was identified
as one of the guitars that had been taken from the Kjar residence;
(5) on July 5, 1993, Defendant paid his sister-in-law, Lisa Van
Cleave, $100 toward monies owed to her by Defendant (R. 248, 324,
Jury Trial Transcript).
In the instant case, there is no physical evidence, whatsoever,
connecting Defendant, as a party, to entering or remaining unlawfully
in the Kjar residence.2

Further, the State presented no evidence,

whatsoever, that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with
the

same mental

state

as the person who

entered

or

remained

unlawfully in the residence and solicited, requested, commanded,
encouraged,

or

intentionally

aided

the person

in

entering

or

unlawfully remaining in the Kjar residence with intent to commit
theft.

See In re J.M.H.,

299 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23-24 (Utah App.

1996) (holding that where defendant first learned of burglary after
its completion he could not possess the mental state necessary to
commit the burglary, and therefore cannot be held liable as an

Especially troubling, is the total lack of effort by the
investigating officers in the instant case to attempt to obtain
fingerprints or to preserve any physical evidence during the course
of the investigation (R. 280-82, Jury Trial Transcript) .
This
failure precluded Defendant from obtaining potentially exculpatory
evidence that might have tended to show his innocence.
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accomplice under § 76-6-202).

In fact, the State's own witness, Lisa

Van Cleave, incontrovertibly testified that Defendant had told her
that he did not burglarize the Kjar home but rather a friend had
burglarized the home and then had asked Defendant to pawn the items
for him as a favor, without Defendant knowing that the items had been
stolen (R. 251-52, 249, Jury Trial Transcript) .

As a result, the

State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it
is required to do.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.

Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary, as
set forth above pursuant to the marshaling requirement, is viewed is
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is insufficient to
support Defendant's conviction of burglary as a party.

Reversal for

insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate in the instant case
because

the

evidence,

even

when

so

viewed,

is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted.

That reasonable doubt was entertained is

evidenced by the jury's written communication with the trial court
shortly after the jury began its deliberations.

The note from the

jury stated, "What does *party' mean in regards to when a person
became aware of a crime?

Is a person a "party" to burglary if they

are aware of the crime after it was committed, or do they have to be
aware of it before hand?

Or during?

included) .
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Help" (R. 86)

(emphasis

In the instant case, the State's case hinges on the inferences
to be drawn from Defendant's close proximity to the Kjar residence by
way of his construction work at the Kjar home around the time of the
burglary, and that Defendant, shortly after the burglary, pawned a
portion of the stolen property.3

These events, taken together with

the other evidence marshaled above, establish no probative inference
that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with the same
mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully in the
residence

and

solicited,

requested,

commanded,

encouraged,

or

intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in
the Kjar residence with intent to commit theft.

Even when viewed in

the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the State's evidence
simply does not support a reasonable inference that Defendant had the
mental

state or conduct required by statute for conviction of

burglary as a party.

"Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture

or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."

See Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993) (noting that the

State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred
constitutional safeguards at its core").

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
AS TO WHAT IS REQUIRED IN TERMS OF ONE'S AWARENESS OF

3

Cf. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) (holding
that "[t]he mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient to
justify a conviction of larceny of the property . . . . " )
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A CRIME PRIOR TO BEING CONVICTED AS A PARTY TO THE
CRIME OF BURGLARY.
"A trial court has' a duty to instruct the jury on the law
State

applicable to the facts of the case."

232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter,
1981)).

827 P.2d

627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah

"Jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole. "

State v. Lucero,
Johnson,

v. Hamilton,

866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State

114 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989)).

v.

The jury instructions

must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as to the basic
Id.

elements of the crime as charged.
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)).

(citing State

v. itoberts, 711

"However, if taken as a whole they

fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact
that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as
it might have been is not reversible error."
Brooks,

638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981); State

Id.
v.

(citing State
Tennyson,

v.

850 P.2d

461, 470 (Utah App. 1993)).
The challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the
law presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
State

v.

Archuleta,

850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993), cert,

114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); Hamilton,
Farr,

770 P.2d 131, 133

Serv.

Dist.

No.

1987)); Lucero,

1 v.

827 P.2d at 238 (citing Ramon

(Utah 1989); Western

Jackson

denied,

Cattle

Co.,

Kane

County

v.

Special

744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah

866 P.2d at 3.

This jury instruction issue in the instant appeal is raised for
the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, the failure to raise an issue
20

before the trial court precludes consideration of the issue on
appeal.

State

v.

Jennings,

875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).

There are, however, two limited but well-established exceptions to
this general rule. State v. Archambeau,
1991).

820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.

The appellate court may address an issue for the first time

on appeal if the trial court committed plain error or there are
exceptional circumstances.
In State

Id.

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme

Court outlined the following principles involved in determining
whether "plain error'7 exists:
In general, to establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an
alleged error that was not properly objected to,
the appellant must show the following: (i) An
error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome
for
the
appellant,
or
phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see also

State

v. Portillo,

App. 1996); and State v. Tenney,
According to State v. Verde,

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah

913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996).

770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), "in

most circumstances, the term ^manifest injustice' [found in Utah R.
Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the

^plain error' standard

expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). . . ."
The

second

exception

is

the

catch-all

"exceptional" or "unusual" circumstances.
923.

device

Archambeau,

requiring
820 P.2d at

This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that
21

manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an
issue

on

appeal."

circumstances

Id.

exception

According
applies

to

Dunn,

primarily

to

the

exceptional

rare

procedural

anomalies. . . ." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3 (citing Archambeau,

82 0

P.2d at 922-26).
As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial
court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury as to
what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime prior to
being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary.

The trial court

utilized the following jury instructions to instruct the jury as to
the elements of burglary and the definition of party liability for a
criminal act of another:
Instruction No. 15
Before you can convict the defendant, Roger
Wayne VanCleave [sic], of the crime of burglary
as charged in the Information on file in this
case, you must believe from all of the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every
one of the following elements of that offense:
1.
That on or before the 5th day of July,
1993, in Davis County, State of Utah, a dwelling
in Centerville was unlawfully entered; and
2.
Whoever entered that dwelling on that
occasion did so with the intent to commit theft;
and
3.
That Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic],
defendant, was a party to the offense referred
to in paragraphs one and two; and
4.
That said Roger Wayne Van Cleave [sic]
acted intentionally or knowingly.
If after careful consideration of all the
evidence in this case, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of
the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand you
are convinced of the truth of each and every one
22

of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty
of burglary as charged in the Information on
file in this case.
(R. 58.);
Instruction No. 18
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of burglary, who
directly
commits burglary, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aides another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes burglary shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Thus, if you find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Roger
Wayne VanCleave [sic], was a party to the
burglary charged in the Information you may find
him guilty even though you are not convinced
that he personally entered the dwelling.
(R. 62.);
Instruction No. 22
You are instructed that in every crime or
public offense, there must be a union or joint
operation of the act and intent.
(R. 67.) .
Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial court
received the following note from the jury:

"What does "party" mean

in regards to when a person became aware of a crime?

Is a person a

"party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it was
committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand?
Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included).

Or during?

As evidenced by the in-chambers

exchange between the trial court and counsel, the trial court was
obviously aware, as a result of the jury's note, that further
instruction was necessary concerning the jury's question concerning
23

awareness of the crime of burglary in order for Defendant to be
convicted

as a party

of burglary

(See

R.

348-50,

Transcript and Statement of Fact #12 above) .

Jury Trial

In fact, the trial

court initially recognized, during the in-chambers discussion, that
the jury instructions, as constituted, were inadequate (R. 349, line
3, Jury Trial Transcript) . Further, in the course of the in-chambers
conference, the prosecution stated, "I think it's

clear

in

the

law

that if

[Defendant] finds out after, he's not a party to the

burglary.

To be guilty of burglary, it has to be before or during."

(R. 349, lines 4-6, Jury Trial Transcript).

Instead of instructing

the jury that a person has to be aware of the burglary before or
during the burglary in order to be a party, the trial court merely
referred them to a copy of Instruction No. 22, instructing the jury
that "in every crime or public offense, there must be a union or
joint operation of the act and intent." By so doing, the trial court
erred by failing to accurately and adequately inform the jury as to
the basic elements of criminal responsibility as a party to the crime
of burglary. Moreover, the jury instructions, when taken as a whole,
failed to fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
in terms of the elements of party liability and the crime of
burglary.

The trial court's error is especially egregious in light

of the jury's clear request for further instruction concerning
awareness of the crime of burglary.
The failure of the trial court to accurately instruct the jury
affected the substantial rights of Defendant by failing to insure
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that received his constitutional right to a fair trial. As a result,
the trial court's errors were harmful because such errors undermine
any confidence this Court might have that Defendant received a fair
trial.
In

See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1201; Portillo,
addition

to

plain

error,

the

exceptional or unusual circumstances.

914 P.2d at 726.
instant

case

presents

As evidenced by the in-

chambers exchange about the jury's request for further instruction
about party liability, there existed significant confusion about the
nature of party liability in terms of the party liability statute.
The trial court, at that particular point, had a duty to clarify the
law of party liability as it pertained facts of the case as inquired
about by the jury in its note.to the court.
238.

Hamilton,

827 P.2d at

To not consider and correct this matter on appeal would result

in a great and manifest injustice or harm by failing to protect the
constitutional right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse Defendant's conviction of burglary and remand the case
for a new trial with instructions to correct the errors committed in
the course of the jury trial.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the sufficiency of evidence
principles,

circumstantial

evidence, and what

is

required

for

conviction as a party to a crime, which are matters of continuing
public

interest

and

which

involve

issues

requiring

further

development in the area of criminal law case development.

Counsel

for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official
Publication" for purposes of precedential value and instruction in
future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IfctT) day of October, 1996.
/^^RlfoLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

"ST2e4^t-i/ Wi^g^s
Attorneys for Appellant
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